



NOVAMIGRA

NORMS AND VALUES IN THE
EUROPEAN MIGRATION AND REFUGEE CRISIS

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Summary report on value agents in public and civil society institutions

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Executive Summary

Integration – economic, social, and cultural – is the most relevant durable solution for the majority of refugees and migrants in the European Union (EU). Many EU Member States have placed integration high on the policy and political agenda since the mid-1990s, several decades before the current ‘refugee crisis.’ However, the ‘crisis’ has given integration even more importance.

In this report, we consider immigrant integration as a dynamic, multi-pronged process, in which different groups of refugees and immigrants as well as representatives of already diverse receiving societies work together to build secure, vibrant, and cohesive communities. Many member states have invested in programs aimed at teaching newcomers about ‘European values’ and the necessity to share these values to maintain social cohesion.

In this report, we map central ‘value agents’ in public and civil society organizations that facilitate refugee and immigrant integration and examine the values that motivate and guide programs and staff assisting refugees in their integration processes. The report discusses four important aspects of ‘value transmission’:

- Which values are prioritized in different countries;
- What values are being transmitted;
- Who transmits them; and
- How different values are being transmitted.

Our research suggests that different countries follow different paths in terms of prioritizing the values they focus on in transmitting ‘European values’ both to refugees and migrants as well as to the general public. In Italy, in addition to the values promoted by the Italian Constitution, values enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and in the Lisbon Treaty are lauded as values underpinning integration activities. Italy seems to be the exception among the studied countries. Most countries focus on national values. These values might overlap with some of the ‘European values’ but are nevertheless presented as national values. There is a wide range of values being transmitted in each country:

- In France, the ‘values of the Republic’ are most important (secularism, democracy, and equality of all citizens regardless of creed, race, and origin);
- In Germany, values related to *Leitkultur* (defining culture) and *Heimat* (lit: home) figure most prominently in debates on values;
- Sweden promotes values such as equality of all, freedom and dignity, democracy, participation, protection against discrimination, right to private and family life, rights of the child, and ecological sustainability;
- In the Netherlands, ‘Dutch Core Values’ (*Nederlandse kernwaarden*) include freedom, equality, solidarity, and participation. These values are part of a ‘Declaration of Participation’ (*participatieverklaring*) immigrants are required to sign upon admission to the Netherlands.
- In Poland and in Hungary, discussion of values centers on how to preserve and protect ‘European values’ from the adverse effects of values enshrined in Islam that are not

compatible with Christian European values. Both countries also feel threatened by liberal values promoted by the European Union, such as gender equality and respect for diversity.

Many different actors and entities engage in value transmission. The most prominent value agents are the states. In some instances, they distribute information about 'national values' and provide education and training to newcomers, in other cases they fund local governments and civil society organizations to explicitly transmit particular values and/or facilitate integration of refugees and immigrants. Public schools are probably the most important state value agents. Public schools play an extremely important role in transmitting values to refugee children and other resident children and indirectly to their families. For parents of refugee and migrant children, schools are often one of the first places where they encounter representatives of the host society.

National and local actors use a range of practices and strategies to transmit values to refugees and immigrants. Training and educational programs dominate the scene. In addition to training and educational programs, countries deploy other strategies to transmit shared values to refugees and immigrants such as information dissemination through publications and websites; cross-cultural and religious dialogues; crime prevention programs, including prevention of religious extremism; familiarizing migrants with national laws and legal norms; activities focused on political (voting rights) and civic participation (volunteering opportunities).

Several of the studied countries have implemented integration courses and contracts and set up civic and citizenship tests. France, Italy, and the Netherlands have implemented not only language and integration course, but also other mechanisms (tests, point systems) to ensure that immigrants fulfil their duties and not pose a burden on the welfare states. This is an implicit way to make sure that refugees and immigrants gain knowledge of the national values of the country where they have settled. Although there are considerable differences between the various contracts and training programs, they all share a common purpose: to promote the core values declared to be the substantive foundation of the political community.

This report ends with a set of recommendations on what kinds of activities are needed to enhance immigrant integration in Europe, including to:

- Increase participation of refugees and migrants and ethnic community organizations in the decision-making processes in Brussels, in the capital cities, and in local municipalities;
- Provide refugees and immigrants with work permits as early as possible and integrate them into the labor market since opportunities for upward mobility represent a crucial incentive for newcomers to integrate themselves;
- Enhance media coverage of refugee and immigrant communities with a focus on human interest stories, community organizing efforts, migrant rights and away from stories of conflict;
- Empower migrants for participation in the wider community. In both social and economic terms, it is important to stress opportunities and obligations as much as rights and entitlements;
- Facilitate linkages with the wider society;

- The European Commission ought to strategize how to support refugee and immigrant youth as well as children of refugees and immigrants to ensure their civic and political participation in their respective countries. The tendency to see children of refugees and immigrants as growing up in migrancy is dangerous.

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Abstract

Economic, social, and cultural integration of refugees and immigrants settled in Europe is important to their well-being and sense of belonging as well as to the social cohesion of the wider society. Many EU member states have invested in programs aimed at teaching newcomers about ‘European values’ and the necessity to share these values to maintain social cohesion. In this report, we map central ‘value agents’ in public and civil society organizations that facilitate refugee and immigrant integration and examine the values that motivate and guide programs and staff assisting refugees in their integration processes. The report provides a set of recommendations and calls to action aimed at policy-makers, program managers, and community leaders.

1. Introduction

Integration – economic, social, and cultural – is the most relevant durable solution for the majority of refugees and migrants in the European Union (EU). Many EU Member States have placed integration high on the policy and political agenda since the mid-1990s, several decades before the current ‘refugee crisis.’ However, the ‘crisis’ – omnipresent in the media, in public debates, and in politics – seems to have given integration even more importance. Striving for social cohesion on the European continent, the European Union and the European Commission are very much interested in better understanding integration processes and factors that facilitate them. They are also interested in making sure that refugees and migrants settling in Europe understand and share the values that underpin the European project.

The term ‘integration’ gained currency in the community of policy-makers relatively recently. It represents an evolution in migration scholarship more than any other change in the immigrant experience. Most of the terms used by migration scholars (and consequently policy-makers) over the past century to describe the construction of new lives related to an outsider-insider dichotomy, conjuring a process that does not necessarily end with inclusion. The vocabulary used to describe the process of incorporating newcomers into the new settlements included terms such as assimilation, acculturation, incorporation, and socio-economic adjustment. These concepts seemed ‘wedded to a normative vision of societies as culturally homogenous, in which residents born in other places are exceptional rather than customary participants in economic, social, and cultural life.’² With increased international migration from the global South to the global North, the growth of South-South migration, and the proliferation of transnational migratory patterns, the dichotomic concepts do not fit the reality of mobile populations.

In this report, we consider immigrant integration as a dynamic, multi-pronged process, in which different cohorts of refugees and immigrants as well as representatives of already diverse receiving societies work together to build secure, vibrant, and cohesive communities. We recognize that newly arriving refugees are entering countries which might already have sizable immigrant and refugee communities that came years before the current ‘crisis’ as well as communities that remain fairly homogeneous. In these scenarios we are emphasizing the need to integrate between and among different groups of residents. We also recognize that the concept of integration is slowly being replaced by scholars by the notion of belonging.

Many EU countries have made significant investments in programs facilitating refugee and migrant integration, including programs aimed at teaching newcomers about European values and the necessity to share them in order to maintain social cohesion. In the NOVAMIGRA project, we have created a comprehensive picture of value-related programs in eight countries of the European Union, namely France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, and Sweden. We have also

² Ray, B. 2002. Immigrant Integration: Building to Opportunity. Migration Policy Institute https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/immigrant-integration-building-opportunity?fbclid=IwAR3vrMfi8VycxLCY1uErdOiu_2TMrU4qU87guRW6teMY67Xk6x43QdZmDT0

identified the types of individuals – civil servants, civil society leaders, educators, social workers, language teachers – who are involved in transmitting different values to refugees and migrants.

In the EU policy language these individuals are often referred to as value agents. However, this terminology is not widely accepted on the ground, especially among refugees and migrants who often have negative connotations associated with the word ‘agent.’ The ‘value agents’ themselves do not always subscribe to this terminology either. Moreover, they often do not describe their activities in terms of values and value promotion, but rather in terms of motivations that underline their actions and facilitate their involvement in integration programs. UN actors such as the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) use the less-loaded term ‘cultural orientation’ when referring to value transmission. We use these terms in this report being fully cognizant that they are merely labels used by policy-makers.

The country teams that carried out the desk studies that serve as the basis for this report understood the term ‘value agent’ quite broadly as somebody who acts on the basis of their ‘values’ (normative commitments). The ‘agents’ identified in the course of this research were either individuals or organizations, including national and local governments. As the Dutch team argued, every individual agent (person) is a ‘value agent’ because arguably every person has at least some normative commitments that motivate them to perform particular actions. In terms of organizations and institutions, however, two types of ‘value agents’ were distinguished, namely organizations driven by particular values, and organizations conveying particular values to immigrants and refugees.

2. Objectives

The overall objective of this task was to **create a comprehensive picture of ‘value agents’ and value-related practices in migrant integration contexts** in selected European countries. Complementing the policy and public discourse oriented research done in Work Package 2, Work Package 3 **examined the societal and practical side of engaging with migrant integration** and considered which values motivate and guide programs and staff facilitating refugee and migrant integration. Simply put, this part of the project aimed at **mapping central ‘value agents’ in public and civil society organizations** that facilitate refugee and immigrant integration.

The tasks associated with these objectives included:

- Exploring which values are considered core and fundamental to these value agents,
- Exploring their value basis (religion, ideology, national/European identity, etc.),
- Examining how these values are framed (e.g., as collective, national or European values),
- Highlighting tensions/conflicts surrounding particular values,
- Examining how value agents transmit values in practice to specific members of the public (school students, citizens) as well as to immigrant groups specifically (for example, in language and/or civic education courses),
- Highlighting gaps between policy or mission statements and practical implementation, and
- Identifying best and promising practices.

3. Synergies with other Work Packages

In large projects such as NOVAMIGRA, it is important to maintain linkages between and among various Work Packages. Given the enormity and depth of theoretical analyses and empirical research undertaken in this project, the task of sustaining on-going synergies with seemingly different activities is both challenging and beneficial to the overall outcomes of the project. The interdisciplinary character of the NOVAMIGRA project facilitates and eases this task somewhat, but also contributes to interesting interdisciplinary discussions among the team members on different understandings of norms and values, especially those stemming from empirical research.

The activities undertaken to develop this summary report benefited greatly from activities undertaken within Work Package 1 (WP1) and Work Package 2 (WP2).

In WP1, the development of the bibliography (publicly available on the NOVAMIGRA website) and the conceptual map (restricted access document) were of particular importance.

The bibliography provided both a fairly comprehensive literature review of pertinent publications in philosophy, anthropology, political science, and migration studies and a more in-depth mapping of the literature on what could be called a value-based approach, on the one hand, and a rights-based approach, on the other hand. These approaches are different ways of connecting basic notions such as values, rights, human rights, and it is this connection that ultimately matters, certainly to the theorists on the team. We used the bibliography (and the conceptual map) to inform the analyses of a wide range of documents and gray literature produced by governments and civil society organizations.

The conceptual map was indispensable in identifying the normative commitments the European Union has made, especially within the Lisbon Treaty (by referring to European values) and through the Charter of Fundamental Rights as well as through the EU *acquis* more generally. It is clear from both written and spoken communiques that the EU is quite adamant about its commitments. However, just what the EU is committed to, and what its commitments imply, is often less clear.

The conceptual map was used in WP3 to 1) map the different values and norms promoted by government and civil society 'value agents,' and 2) test the extent, to which the theoretical framework matches the lived experiences of both 'value agents' and refugees (this will be borne out even more once the empirical research in WP3 is completed).

In WP2, the paper on value-based EU policies on migration guided different country teams involved in conducting their respective desk studies. In particular, the desk study authors compared the EU level policies with the societal and practical side of engaging with migrant integration and considered which values motivate and guide programs and staff facilitating refugee and migrant integration. As will be seen below, in several countries the values and norms articulated by the European Union were not prioritized by national actors in transmitting values to newcomers. In some countries, especially Hungary and Poland, EU migration policies have been completely ignored. Hungary and Poland have

not accepted the refugee quotas proposed by the EU invoking incompatibility of national values with the cultural and religious norms and values adhered to by refugees.

4. Methodology

The picture of 'value agents' and transmission of values in the countries under study is based on three inter-related sources of information. The first source included **desk studies**, carried out by country teams, designed to identify different 'value agents' and the practices and strategies they use to transmit these values. The practices 'value agents' use for the purpose of value transmission were studied by surveying a wide range of documents, including national constitutions, laws and regulations, directives, mission statements, training manuals, and educational curricula. In some instances, the desk survey was augmented by interviews with selected value agents and other key informants. The number of documents needed to be analyzed to complete this task was quite large. As a result, country teams were able to survey only the most important documents. Additionally, while it was relatively easy to identify values of import to the integration process of refugees and immigrants already in Europe as well as organizations and programs charged with transmitting these values, it was much more difficult to evaluate (based solely on desk studies) the efficacy of the practices deployed to transmit values to newcomers. We anticipate that we will have more information on these practices stemming from field research in selected countries (Germany, Greece, Hungary, Poland, and Sweden).

Each country team received explicit instructions on what types of organizations and programs to focus on as well as examples of questions to use to interrogate relevant documents and websites. The **target groups** included:

- 1) Public institutions directly involved in official migrant integration activities:
 - National governments (different ministries, immigration bureaus)
 - City councils and other city government organizations
 - Schools (primary through high school, universities)
 - Language schools
 - Citizenship test providers.
- 2) Civil society institutions facilitating immigrant integration:
 - Community-based organizations serving refugees and migrants
 - Refugee and immigrant-led organizations and informal groups
 - Religious organizations (churches, temples, synagogues as well as other faith-based organizations such as Caritas, Jesuit Refugee Services, Red Crescent Society, etc.)
 - Sport clubs, youth organizations, Scout groups, cultural centers, etc.
- 3) Other key agents that actively influence public opinion on migration and integration:
 - Different kinds of media (TV, news media, online blogs)
 - Mainstream and migrant media

Additionally, each country team was provided examples of questions to answer while analyzing pertinent documents. The questions included the following:

On identifying ‘value agents’

Who are the ‘value agents’ at a **national/local level**? In some countries, there is not much happening at the national level, but particular jurisdictions—cities and towns—where immigrants have settled have undertaken special initiatives aimed at transmitting values to immigrants and refugees.

1. Who are these value agents? Provide as many examples as possible. Distinguish between public and civil society agents. Do they receive special training? Who trains them? If available, document contact information (will be very useful when we embark on field research).
2. Who gives them their mandate? Are they self-appointed agents who saw the need for these activities? Explore the history of a particular type of agent and the organization they represent. We would like to know if these initiatives stemmed from the recent influx of refugees or whether they predate the recent migration flows. When did these value agents start working?
3. What kind of relationships these national/local value agents have with European, national and local governments (e.g., the mayor’s office, local school boards, EU project funds, etc.)
4. Who funds their activities?
5. Are the activities carried out on a regular basis or in an ad hoc manner? Explore this further to understand when the agents get mobilized.
6. How are these value agents linked transnationally, nationally or trans-locally (networks of influence)?

On the mapping of ‘value agents’ and their value basis

1. Which values are transmitted in the countries under study? Document examples and definitions of these values?
2. How are these values framed (as European, national, collective, religious, ideological or other)?
3. How are values chosen? How are they prioritized?
4. Are the same values taught by all value agents involved? Or do some agents specialize in transmitting particular values? Which ones and why? Explore by categories (e.g., civic, political, legal, social, cultural)
7. Which social groups and NGOs are active in the value transmission? And more broadly, in facilitating immigrant integration? Provide examples. If possible, document contact information (will be very useful when we embark on field research).
8. How are these values transmitted (e.g., specialized training programs, incorporated into educational curricula, public service announcements)?

On practices to transmit values

1. What is the mode of educating immigrants and refugees about European values at each level? Provide as many examples as you can. Examples might include: Written materials, Video or film, training programs, special classes? Other?
2. Explore the difference between transmitting values to children and adults.
3. If possible, collect appropriate curricula, manuals, etc.

4. Who designs these materials/training/educational programs?
5. What is the process of developing these materials? Who gets to have a say?
6. In what language/s is this information disseminated? In what language/s are the training and other educational programs conducted?
7. Where and how are written materials distributed?
8. At which point after arrival are refugees and immigrants provided with this information?
9. Are the refugees and immigrants being tested on this newly acquired knowledge? How? If possible, identify tests/exam questions.
10. If the mode of transmission involves training or other educational programs, are refugees and immigrants obliged to participate? Is participation mandatory or voluntary? If it is mandatory, what happens if a refugee or immigrant refuses to participate?
11. What modes of transmission are most effective? How is effectiveness evaluated?
12. Explore what works best and what doesn't. Collect examples of best practices and challenges.

The second source of information is a volume entitled *Europe and the Refugee Response: A Crisis of Values?*, edited by Elżbieta M. Goździak, Izabella Main, and Brigitte Suter, to be published by Routledge in early 2020. The third and final source of information are the presentations of desk study findings and ensuing discussions held in Poznan in March 2019 during a workshop devoted to the issue of value transmission.

5. Organization of the report

The findings section of the report discusses four important issues, namely which values are prioritized in different countries; what values are being transmitted; who transmit them; and how different values are being transmitted. In each subsection, we use selected examples from different countries to illustrate a particular point. The report ends with a set of recommendations on what kinds of activities are needed to enhance immigrant integration in Europe. These calls to action are based on the analysis of the desk studies and identification of existing gaps as well as ongoing empirical research both in Europe (especially Germany, Greece, Hungary, Poland, and Sweden) and in countries hosting refugees outside the European continent (e.g., Lebanon, Turkey, Thailand). And last but not least, these recommendations are also informed by the authors' previous research on refugee and immigrant integration in Europe and in the United States, personal experiences of working with non-governmental organizations providing assistance to refugees and immigrants, direct involvement in policy-making, and lived experiences as refugees and migrants.

6. Findings

This part of the report presents major themes identified in the course of analyzing country-based desk studies and during the meeting on transmission of values held in March 2019 in Poznan, Poland. In some instances, the findings have also been informed by the ongoing field research and by several chapters included in the forthcoming volume on *Europe and the Refugee Response: A Crisis of values?*, edited by Elżbieta M. Goździak, Izabella Main, and Brigitte Suter, to be published by Routledge in early 2020.

6.1 Which values are prioritized?

There are multiple interpretations of ‘European values.’ The expression is often subject to different uses and misuses by individuals and institutions.³ When the European Commission issued the Call for Proposals to investigate values and norms aimed at promoting the European public and cultural space, they assumed that the European Union’s fundamental values--respect for human dignity and human rights, freedom, democracy, equality, and the rule of law--would be prioritized in activities aimed at integrating refugees and migrants into different European societies. Making sure that newly arrived refugees and migrants understood what the shared values were was particularly important given the prevailing notion that many of the values refugees, especially Muslim refugees, adhere to are not compatible with European values.⁴

However, different countries follow different paths in terms of **prioritizing the values** they focus on in transmitting ‘European values’ both to refugees and migrants as well as to the general public. In **Italy**, in addition to the values promoted by the Italian Constitution, values enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and in the Lisbon Treaty are lauded as values underpinning integration activities.

Italy seems to be the exception among the eight countries we studied. Most countries focus on national values. These values might overlap with some of the ‘European values’ but are nevertheless presented as national values. In some countries, such as **France**, the Constitution and the values enshrined in it, serve as a springboard for transmission of the most important values, including secularism, democracy, and equality of all citizens regardless of creed, race, and origin. These are called the ‘values of the Republic’ and are part and parcel of the ‘civic turn’⁵ in immigration and integration policies implemented in a variety of European countries from the late 1990s onwards.⁶ The emphasis on ‘shared values’ is consistent with the directives of the European Commission and the Council of Europe⁷ as well as with the various civic education policies dedicated to the inculcation of the values shared by ‘good citizens.’⁸ Adherence to the ‘values of the Republic’ is thought to be a pre-requisite to successful integration into the French society.

In **Germany**, the government’s new emphasis on integration has come with a range of public debates on the conditions and limits of social and political cohesion. This has intensified with a heightened public sensibility for Islamic extremism since the terror attacks of 2001. The term around which these

³ Woollard, C. 2018. Has the Mediterranean Refugee Crisis Undermined European Values? *IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook* 2018.

⁴ Brzozowski, W. 2018. Is Islam Incompatible with European Identity? (September 28, 2018). University of Milano-Bicocca School of Law Research Paper No. 18-15. Available at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3301195>

⁵ Mouritsen, P. & Jørgensen, K.E. (eds.) 2008. *Constituting Communities: Political Solutions to Cultural Conflict*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

⁶ Hachimi Alaoui, M. & Pélabay, J. Integration by contract and the “values of the Republic”: Investigating the French State as a value promoter for migrants (2003-2016). In E.M.Goździak, I.Main, & B. Suter (Eds.) *Europe and the Refugee Response: A Crisis of Values?* Abington: Routledge: forthcoming.

⁷ Pélabay, J. 2011. L’Europe des ‘valeurs communes’ et le recul du multiculturalisme: la diversité supplantée par l’unité?, *Revue Philosophique de Louvain*, 109 (4) : 747-770.

⁸ Kostakopoulou, D. 2010. Matters of Control: Integration Tests, Naturalisation Reform and Probationary Citizenship in the United Kingdom, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 36 (5): 829-846

debates were conducted, especially in conservative circles, was *Leitkultur* (defining culture). It was originally taken up from an essay by the Syrian-born German academic Bassam Tibi,⁹ who argued that Europe should define itself around core Enlightenment values vis-à-vis incoming migrants. Taken up by Christian conservative politicians, *Leitkultur* was reconceptualized in a more particular and culturalist way in the German public debate, becoming associated with the demand for assimilation to German majority culture.

With the recent influx of refugees in **Germany**, some Christian conservative politicians have renewed the debate on *Leitkultur*,¹⁰ while others have argued that ‘shared values’¹¹ or – as Robert Habeck, co-leader of the Green Party suggested – “*Heimat*” (lit: home) would be more neutral terms around which to conduct debates on the aims of integration. Yet others have held that integration should not be understood in terms of shared values or cultural aspects at all, but should instead focus exclusively on social, economic, and political participation.¹²

It is noteworthy that many, but not all, **German** government-issued documents make some effort to distance themselves from the cultural connotations of *Leitkultur*. This is visible in the government’s increased efforts to diversify funding for civil society initiatives focused on immigrant integration. Additionally, the German government has encouraged migrant organizations to get involved in integration and take on the role of mediators between incoming refugees and the German society. It remains to be seen, however, whether Germany’s new emphasis on shared values can avoid the assimilationist connotations it developed in the *Leitkultur* debate.

In **Sweden**, the constitution consisting of four different legislative acts – the Instrument of Government, the Act of Succession, the Freedom of Press Act, and the Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression – is used to define what constitutes fundamental values that ought to be shared by all people residing in the country. These values include: equality of all, freedom and dignity, democracy, participation, protection against discrimination, right to private and family life, rights of the child, and ecological sustainability. These values are built on international conventions, including the European Convention on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).

⁹ Tibi, B. 1996. Multikultureller Werte-Relativismus und Werte-Verlust, *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B 52-53/96, pp. 27-36.

¹⁰ De Maizièrè, T. 2017. Wir sind nicht Burka, *BILD-Zeitung*, 29.04.2017. Available at: <https://www.bild.de/politik/inland/thomas-de-maiziere/leitkultur-fuer-deutschland-51509022.bild.html>

¹¹ Zimmermann, O. 2017. Man darf sich vor einer fremden Kultur fürchten, In: Zeit online, 27.12.2017. Available at: <https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2017-11/kulturelle-integration-leitkultur-werte-olaf-zimmermann-deutscher-kulturrat-interview> .

¹² See Kipping, K. 2017. Ein Land für alle – Bemerkungen zur Idee einer solidarischen Einwanderungsgesellschaft, Berliner Reden zur Integrationspolitik. https://www.diw.de/de/diw_01.c.564717.de/publikationen_veranstaltungen/veranstaltungen/veranstaltungsreihen/berliner_reden_zur_integrationspolitik/berliner_reden_zur_integrationspolitik_archiv_kipping.html; and Özoğuz, A. 2017. Gesellschaftsvertrag statt Leitkultur: Leitkultur verkommt zum Klischee, *Tagesspiegel*, 14.05.2017. Available at: <https://causa.tagesspiegel.de/gesellschaft/wie-nuetzlich-ist-eine-leitkultur-debatte/leitkultur-verkommt-zum-klischee-des-deutscheins.html>

In the forthcoming volume produced as part of the NOVAMIGRA project, Christian Fernández¹³ argues that for many years Swedish immigration policy has rested on the ideal of cosmopolitan Sweden. However, Swedish policy development after the ‘refugee crisis’ puts into question the established Swedish model of cosmopolitanism. “The challenge is not primarily ideological,” argues Fernández, “in that it did not originate from a populist government or a shift away from established humanitarian values. Rather, the challenge derives from changing perceptions of reality, and more specifically of the causal requirements of refugee reception and integration. In this respect, the Swedish post-refugee crisis is a crisis of realities rather than values; the new reality being a world of potentially unprecedented number of asylum-seekers, a dysfunctional EU policy under the Dublin regime, and the limited welfare state capacity for refugee accommodation. The values remain the same, but the circumstances have changed, according to the official government narrative.”

In the **Netherlands**, ‘Dutch Core Values’ (*Nederlandse kernwaarden*) include freedom, equality, solidarity, and participation. These values are part of a ‘Declaration of Participation’ (*participatieverklaring*) immigrants are required to sign upon admission to the Netherlands (see below for more discussion).

Greece presents a different picture. Greece is ethnically very homogenous – 98 percent of the population is composed of ethnic Greeks – and as such does not have a national immigrant integration agenda. During the recent ‘refugee crisis’ Greece has focused mostly on ‘search and rescue’ operations and reception policies. As will be seen later in this report, some of the activities undertaken by those helping refugees have been motivated by the values of solidarity and hospitality. Additionally, memories of forced relocation related to the Greek-Turkish population exchange in 1923 have also played a significant role in accepting refugees.¹⁴ Our research suggests that in Greece, at least at the national level, values seem to change according to the political parties in power. Although social integration is projected as an EU priority which should be adopted by all member states, in Greece, conservative actors advocate for a ‘law and order’ approach, aiming to deport those lacking sufficient documentation and being reluctant in promoting an inclusionary approach. Homogeneity seems to be the main goal behind these actions. On the other hand, progressive actors underline anti-racism, hospitality, inter-culturalism, and solidarity as their core values. Nevertheless, these values are only partially included in the respective policies. The situation at the local level seems to be very similar; instead of political parties, city mayors play the leading role. The centralization of decision-making processes at the national level prevents the local governments to lead migratory policies. Although the national governmental agendas recognize the crucial role of local administration, so far this is limited to the municipalities’ motivations since the legal mandate is missing. Specific progressive municipal authorities find some room to maneuver and take an active role in integration practices, promoting the values of hospitality and solidarity for migrants.

¹³ Fernández, Ch. Cosmopolitanism at the Crossroads: Swedish Immigration Policy after the 2015 Refugee Crisis. In E.M. Goździak, I. Main, & B. Suter (Eds.) *Europe and the Refugee Response: A Crisis of Values?* Abington: Routledge: forthcoming.

¹⁴ Anastasopoulou, M. Echoes of memories of forced displacement: The case of the Greek island of Lesbos. In E.M. Goździak, I. Main, & B. Suter (Eds.) *Europe and the Refugee Response: A Crisis of Values?* Abington: Routledge: forthcoming.

Poland and **Hungary** are true outliers among the eight countries under study. The Polish Constitution guarantees asylum seekers a right to asylum, but this right has been severely curtailed by the current government. Both Poland and Hungary, under the respective rule of the Law and Justice and Fidesz parties, have criminalized¹⁵ migration and presented refugees and asylum seekers as a threat to the security of Europe. Both countries emphasize that in order to preserve and protect ‘European values,’ admission of refugees, particularly Muslim refugees, is not desirable as values enshrined in Islam are not compatible with Christian European values.¹⁶ Additionally, both countries feel threatened by liberal values promoted by the European Union, such as gender equality and respect for diversity. In Poland, both the Catholic Church and the government invoke the need to protect ‘traditional family values’ and see gender equality and respect for LGBTQI communities as an imminent threat to the country’s national identity rooted in Catholicism.

We will discuss the values that are being transmitted in the studied countries in more depth in the next section.

6.2 What values are transmitted?

As indicated above, in **France** the Constitution of 1958 clearly defines what are the values that form the foundation of French public culture. The preamble of the Constitution states France’s commitment towards respecting human rights, national sovereignty, and the liberty of people. The first article states that “ France is a Republic that is indivisible, secular, democratic, and social. It ensures the equality of all citizens before the law without distinction of origin, race or religion. The Republic respects all creeds. Its organization is decentralized. The law favors the equal access of women and men to elected offices and social and professional responsibilities.” The second article of the Constitution defines the official language of France (French), its national symbol (the tricolor flag), its national anthem (the Marseillaise), its motto (liberty, equality, fraternity), and its principle (the government of the people, by the people and for the people). Many French ‘value agents’ thus refer to liberty, equality, fraternity, secularism, and equality between men and women as the values of the Republic.

In addition to promoting the values and principles of the Republic, the French public school curriculum promotes the French Republic’s civic culture, which has four main components: 1) a culture of sensibility and empathy; 2) a culture of the rule of law based on the understanding and respect of the law; 3) a culture of sound judgment and discernment, which has an ethical dimension (an ability to understand conflict of values and contemporary ethical issues) and an intellectual dimension (a capacity for critical thinking and the development of enlightened information habits); and 4) a culture of civic and social engagement favoring collective action, initiation, and responsibility.

¹⁵ Nagy, B. 2016. Hungarian Asylum Law and Policy in 2015–2016: Securitization Instead of Loyal Cooperation in: Special Issue Constitutional Dimensions of the Refugee Crisis. *German Law Journal* 17(6): 1033-1082.

¹⁶ Goździak, E.M. & Márton, P. 2018. Where the Wild Things Are: Fear of Islam and the Anti-Refugee Rhetoric in Hungary and in Poland. *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*. Published online: 21 June 2018, pp. 1-27.

Chiara Marchetti¹⁷ suggests that concepts such as deservingness and the community of value frame the debate about refugees in **Italy**. In order to gain access to certain rights, refugees have to prove that they deserve to receive refugee status and permission to remain in Italy. Only then will they be able to enter the ‘community of value.’ ‘Communities of value’ – a fundamental part of modern state narratives – are imagined and socially constructed as communities populated by “good citizens, law-abiding and hardworking members of stable and respectable families.”¹⁸ Unlike the Others, these ideal citizens share values and patterns of behaviors, form “the legitimate us,” and may therefore receive rights. Terms like ‘immigrant,’ ‘foreigner,’ and ‘asylum seeker’ do not simply refer to immigration status, but are value laden and have negative connotations. As Aihwa Ong explains in her seminal study on Cambodian refugees in the US: to “become ‘good enough’ citizens, newcomers must negotiate among different forms of regulation, and be taught a new way of being cared for and of caring for themselves in their new world.”¹⁹ As will be seen later in this report, in order to remain in Italy, refugees must acquire certain skills and prove that they understand what kind of values they need to adhere to in order to gain access to the ‘community of values.’

There is no explicit reference to ‘values’ on the homepage of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (IND) of the **Dutch** Ministry of Justice and Security.²⁰ However, in a brochure²¹ including a general description of its ‘mission,’²² tasks, and procedures, the IND emphasizes the value of *rechtvaardigheid*, which can be translated as ‘righteousness,’ ‘fairness’ or ‘**justice**’: “The Dutch immigration policy is just.”²³ The relevant understanding of ‘justice’ is not explicated in the brochure. It seems that it is primarily understood in terms of a proper balance between exclusion and inclusion (or admission and non-admission): “Not everyone can stay in the Netherlands or become Dutch, but there is always space for refugees who are in need of protection.”²⁴ However, it is not explained what makes this balance ‘just.’

In most countries, transmission of values is directed at refugees and migrants, but in some countries there are also attempts to **educate the general public** or some segments of the host society about migration and migrants. After all, integration is a two-way street. In **France**, Francetv provides several video clips to school teachers on the topic of immigration. In general, they aim at providing fact checking regarding migration issues as well as historical and critical perspectives.

¹⁷ Marchetti, Ch. How the refugee has become an irregular economic migrant. Rights, deservingness and containment in the Italian asylum system. In E.M. Goździak, I. Main, & B. Suter (Eds.) *Europe and the Refugee Response: A Crisis of Values?* Abington: Routledge: forthcoming.

¹⁸ Anderson, B. 2013. *Us & them? The dangerous politics of immigration control*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

¹⁹ Ong, A. 2003. *Buddha is hiding: Refugees, citizenship, the New America*. University of California Press.

²⁰ This includes the webpage work instructions, stories of workers, statistics and annual report. See <https://ind.nl/over-ind> It should also be noted that on the website of the IND there is no mission or vision document available.

²¹ “Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst. Dé toelatingsorganisatie van Nederland” (January 2019):

<https://ind.nl/Formulieren/6070.pdf>

²² We are hesitant to call it a mission because this “mission” is only a very small part of the document. Also the brochure does not occupy a central place on the homepage.

²³ “Het Nederlandse vreemdelingenbeleid is rechtvaardig.” See “Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst. Dé toelatingsorganisatie van Nederland” (January 2019), <https://ind.nl/Formulieren/6070.pdf>, 5.

²⁴ “Het Nederlandse vreemdelingenbeleid is rechtvaardig. Niet iedereen kan in Nederland verblijven of Nederlander worden, maar voor vluchtelingen die bescherming nodig hebben, is altijd plaats.” See “Immigratie...”, 5.

In the **Netherlands**, a non-governmental organization *Welkom in Utrecht* [Welcome to Utrecht] has been set up with an explicit goal to “welcome” refugees or asylum migrants [*asielmigranten*] to the city of Utrecht: “A warm welcome contributes to their integration,” says their brochure. The organization was founded in 2015 when a large number of refugees arrived in the Netherlands, which led to a variety of local initiatives (by individual persons or organizations) to support the refugees in various ways – “think of sport, music, cooking, [...] hiking, etc.” The main task of *Welkom in Utrecht* is to coordinate and facilitate these initiatives. Among other things, it organizes events that connect locals to refugees, to help them, for example, learn the Dutch language or move to their new houses. The mission of *Welkom in Utrecht* is that refugees can and should become part of Dutch society as soon as possible, and that this ought to be realized through the potential and commitment of both the locals and the refugees. Refugees are being involved in the organization of events and are encouraged to ask other refugees in the camps to join: “It is self-evident that we involve as much as possible those people that this is all about: the refugees.” Once again, there seems to be a close connection between the value of being part of society and the value of participating, and being able to participate in society.

6.3 Who transmits values?

Many different actors and entities engage in value transmission. The most prominent value agents are the states. In some instances they distribute information about ‘national values’ and provide education and training to newcomers, in other cases they fund local governments and civil society organizations to explicitly transmit particular values and/or facilitate integration of refugees and immigrants.

In **Sweden**, the so-called ‘establishment program’ is organized by the state (various departments) and implemented by state actors on national, regional, and local levels. The national Employment services play a crucial role as they draft the individual ‘establishment plan’ together with each migrant, and pay a monthly sum of approximately 800 euro to each program participant; non-participation results in reduction of the monthly stipend. The ‘establishment plan’ includes Swedish language course (SFI), civic orientation (Samhällsorientering) and labor market preparatory activities (internships, CV writing courses, etc.). SFI is arranged by the municipalities, often through the adult education schools (Komvux). Civic orientation is organized by municipalities and supported by the regional County Administrative Board (CAB), while the labor preparatory activities are arranged by the Employment Services themselves and offered by various contracted or collaborating actors (private sector, public sector, civil society). It is noteworthy that in **Sweden**, integration measures for newly arrived immigrants were developed as early as the 1970s. Since 1991, all municipalities receive financial compensation from the national government for every newly arrived migrant²⁵ to cover the cost of language training, civic orientation, and labor market participation.

As indicated above, in the **Netherlands**, the Dutch immigration and asylum policy is implemented by three organizations, called the “asylum chain”: (1) The Immigration and Naturalization Service

²⁵ Riksdagen (1990). Förordning (1990:927) om statlig ersättning för flyktingmottagande m.m. Arbetsmarknadsdepartement, Stockholm. Online: <https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/svensk-forfattningssamling/forordning-1990927-om-statlig-ersattning-for-sfs-1990-927>; Regeringens proposition 1989/90:105 om samordnat flyktingmottagande och nytt system för ersättning till kommunerna, m. m. Stockholm. Online: <https://data.riksdagen.se/fil/62400F2B-8A79-41AA-BD9E-1A97192A911>.

(*Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst*, IND), which decides about admission;²⁶ (2) the Central Organ for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (*Centraal Orgaan opvang asielzoekers*, COA), which is responsible for accommodating asylum seekers;²⁷ and (3) the Repatriation and Departure Service (*Dienst Terugkeer en Vertrek*, DT&V), which “is responsible for expediting the voluntary and forced departure of foreign nationals who are not allowed to stay in the Netherlands.”²⁸ It seems that the state’s involvement is mainly related to the refugee and immigrant status adjudication process.

As will be seen later in this report, some states – such as **Italy** and **France** – instituted ‘integration contracts’ that refugees and immigrants must sign and commit to participation in programs and activities aimed at understanding shared values and facilitating social cohesion. Many of these programs are funded by national governments.

Public schools are probably the most important state value agent. Public schools play an extremely important role in transmitting values to refugee children and indirectly to their families. In all of the countries under study, refugee and migrant children have guaranteed access to public education. Moreover, primary and secondary education is mandatory. For parents of refugee and migrant children, schools are one of the first places where they encounter representatives of the host society.

Education is not just simple information acquisition. It includes knowledge, skills, habits, cognitive abilities, interests, attitudes, and values.²⁹ During their formative years, children’s and youth’s values are influenced not only by parents, older siblings, and the extended family, but also by teachers and school administrators.³⁰ Of course, young people’s beliefs, norms, and values are also affected by peers, social networks, and the media, but teachers and schools play a particularly important role in instilling values in children. In several countries under study in this project, we have identified the importance of public schools and other educational activities in the transmission of values.

In **France**, the public school system is a very important value agent. It actively and explicitly seeks to transmit the values of the Republic. The program “Éducation morale et civique (ECM)” (Civic and moral education) was launched in 2015 with the explicit aim of reinforcing the transmission of the values of the Republic. It is a secular program proposing non-confessional ethical and civic training and frames the values transmitted to all school pupils as being ‘French’ (the values of the Republic) and secular. The program is mandatory in both public and private schools at the primary (one hour per week) and secondary (one hour per two weeks) levels. This program was adopted after the January 2015 attacks. The new Minister of Education, Najat Vallaud-Belkacem, announced a renewed mobilization of the school system for the transmission of the values of the Republic.

²⁶ See <https://ind.nl>

²⁷ See <https://www.coa.nl/en>

²⁸ See <https://english.dienstterugkeerenvertrek.nl>

²⁹ Bačová, B. & Leláková, E. 2014. Attitude of the Present-Day European Teacher. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/275338280_HUMANISTIC_ATTITUDE_OF_THE_PRESENT-DAY_EUROPEAN_TEACHER

³⁰ Pavičić Vukičević, J. 2018. *Curriculum planning of the European values in compulsory education*. PhD Thesis. Filozofski fakultet u Zagrebu, Department of Pedagogy.

In **Greece**, education policy is enshrined in Article 16, Section 4 of the Greek Constitution, which sets out that: Education constitutes a basic mission for the State and shall aim at the moral, intellectual, professional, and physical training of Greeks, the development of national and religious consciousness, and their formation as free and responsible citizens. Schools' regulations in Greece are subject to the national policy on education, and therefore, cannot be treated separately from governmental policies. According to the Greek Constitution, attendance in school is compulsory for all minors under the age of 15, regardless of their citizenship status. The 2013 National Strategy supports integration practices that will ensure low school drop-out rates and suggests hiring civil servants to assist minors in integrating into the school environment.

National values form the core of the educational system in **Poland**. While national values had been emphasized by the communist regime in the past,³¹ they became even more prominent in the public school curricula after 1989. Polish language and literature, history, geography, and civic knowledge classes (*wiedza o społeczeństwie*) and corresponding textbooks focus on Poland and Polish values such as the Catholic faith, honor, fatherland (*Bóg, honor, ojczyzna*), patriotism, and social competences such as cooperation, solidarity, responsibility.³² Furthermore, annual themes for educational activities are devised taking into account these values. In 2018, the centennial anniversary of Polish independence was observed in schools with programs focused on 'patriotic attitudes.'³³ Teachers and school directors were obliged to organize activities – gatherings, art and music competitions, and marches – aimed at transmitting values of patriotism.

Civil society organizations in **Poland** often try to expand the officially promoted values by organizing training programs and activities focused on democracy, human rights, tolerance, pluralism, equality, values that correspond with their mission and their founders' and sponsors' priorities. As a result, value transmission in Poland is very heterogenous, place- and process-dependent. In 2015, the Law and Justice controlled Ministry of the Interior and Public Administration decided to limit NGOs' access to EU funds. As a result, assistance to migrants and training on migration for the wider Polish society, such as educational and training programs, advocacy, legal counseling, integration events, have been drastically limited or stopped altogether.³⁴

While the Hungarian curriculum sets aside one hour of instruction per week to promotion of diversity, our filed research in **Hungary** suggests that these classes are devoted mainly to discussions of disability and accommodation for disabled children. Interviews with several teachers working in public schools in Budapest indicate that any attempt to include discussion of solidarity with migrants, religious tolerance, especially related to Islam, are thwarted by school administrators. Some teachers also admitted that it is unclear what effect the newly passed legislation that criminalizes assistance to migrants might have on educators if they wanted to include any migration-related content into the

³¹ Zaremba, M. 2001. *Komunizm, legitymizacja, nacjonalizm. Nacjonalistyczna legitymizacja władzy komunistycznej w Polsce*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Trio, ISP PAN.

³² <https://podstawaprogramowa.pl/Szkola-podstawowa-I-III>

³³ <https://www.gov.pl/web/edukacja/godnosc-wolnosc-niepodleglosc> « "100 rocznica odzyskania niepodległości – wychowanie do wartości i kształtowanie patriotycznych postaw uczniów »

³⁴ Klaus, W. E. Ostaszewska-Żuk, & M. Szczepanik. 2017. *Fundusze europejskie i ich rola we wspieraniu integracji cudzoziemców w Polsce*. Warsaw: Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, Association for Legal Intervention. Available at: https://interwencjaprawna.pl/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/raport_po-FAMI_net.pdf

curriculum. Some admitted that they are scared to even mention migration in social science or geography classes. Teachers in private schools have a lot more freedom and they take advantage of it to promote values of religious tolerance, acceptance and appreciation of diversity, not only in terms of diversity stemming from migration, but also diversity related to gender identity. Religious schools are gaining more and more prominence in Hungary. Many are thought of as providing excellent quality of education, therefore they see pupils of different religious backgrounds as well as pupils coming from atheist families. These are obviously self-selected students and families as competition to be admitted to some of the best religious schools is fierce.

Next to public schools, civil society organizations, funded both by public and private money, play an important role in value transmission. Here we focus on mainstream civil society organizations; refugee- and migrant-led programs are featured later on in this report, in a separate section, to highlight their particular importance.

Swedish civil society organizations (CSOs) were actively involved in the reception of newly arrived refugees during the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015 and were able to mobilize funds and volunteers both independently and in cooperation with public authorities.³⁵ For example, *Save the Children* (Rädda barnen) engages both in advocacy – through the legislative consultation process – and direct service provision to migrant children in difficult situations by offering material and psychological support. Their activities in the refugee reception system and asylum adjudication process are informed by the normative principle of the ‘best interest of the child.’ This value stems directly from the human rights enshrined in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.³⁶

In **Poland**, there is a number of organizations working for migrants and refugees. Among them is Fundacja Ocalenie (Rescue Foundation). Since 2000, the Foundation helps refugees, migrants, and repatriated to build a new life in Poland; supports their integration and individual development. It works for intercultural dialogue and strengthening of the civil society. It strives to make every human being able to live with dignity and respect. The Foundation is part of the international organization *Refugees Welcome*. The Foundation is run by some 30 people, half of them immigrants coming from diverse countries. They support integration of foreigners in Warsaw because they believe that immigrants are part of the Warsaw community.³⁷ In Poznan, the Center for Migration Studies and Migrant Info Point play a similar role. They organized actions and campaigns to change social attitudes towards migrants and refugees. The campaign *Adopt a life vest* aimed at drawing attention to the political decisions barring refugees from entering Poland. Its goal was to raise awareness, trigger emotions, induce public discussions, and to make the Polish society think about refugees. The organizers realized that anti-refugee discourse was prevalent in the mass-media, which referred to

³⁵ Turunen, J. & Weinryb, N. 2017. Volontärer i välfärdsstaten: socialt arbete med transitflyktingar som politisk handling. In S. Linde & R. Scaramuzzino (eds), *Socialt arbete i civilsamhället: aktörer, former och strukturer*. Lund: Studentlitteratur.

³⁶ Scaramuzzino, R. & Suter, B. Holding course: Civil society organizations’ value expressions in the Swedish legislative consultation system before and after 2015. In E.M. Goździak, I. Main, & B. Suter (Eds.) *Europe and the Refugee Response: A Crisis of Values?* Abington: Routledge: forthcoming.

³⁷ <https://ocalenie.org.pl/o-nas>; <http://refugees-welcome.pl/?lang=en>; <http://warszawa.wyborcza.pl/warszawa/7,54420,22780134,warszawa-zaprasza-przybyszow.html>

anonymous "waves," "threats," and "problems," while people still crossed the sea risking their lives. The goal of the campaign was to strengthen the language of compassion and to empower people who did not agree with the dominant anti-refugee discourse in the public sphere in Poland. The vests in cafes, cinemas, restaurants, schools, and offices represented people who would like to sit in these places and drink coffee, watch a movie, study, and live in a safe place. Absent refugees were represented as people with the same needs as the inhabitants of Poznan.³⁸

Since religion is such a big part of the public discourse on the 'refugee crisis,' it is important to emphasize the role of faith-based organizations in refugee and immigrant integration, both Christian and Muslim ones. In **France**, *Secours Islamique France* is an association promoting international solidarity and humanitarian assistance. It organizes direct relief actions and public advocacy campaigns. It is inspired by the values of solidarity and respect for human rights and dignity, which are framed as core Muslim values. With regard to asylum seekers in France, *Secours Islamique France* seeks to provide better living conditions for those who have been forcibly displaced and are now on French territory. It has set up shelters and accommodation for asylum seekers and provides logistical assistance. It also engages in public advocacy activities aimed at promoting solidarity towards the refugees. For instance, it recently organized a campaign criticizing the law *Asile et immigration*.

Although not an organization directly addressing migration related issues, the *Conseil français du culte musulman* (CFCM) indirectly addresses value transmission to immigrant populations and the larger French society by providing an official interlocutor representing Muslims. Indeed, some immigrants are of Islamic faith and as Islam, the second most important religion in **France** (around five percent of the population), is often perceived by many as a foreign religion changing the cultural landscape of France or threatening its core Christian or secular. The CFCM was created in 2003 by the Ministry of Interior, when Nicolas Sarkozy was the Minister. The CFCM's goal is to form an authoritative body representing Islam in France and able to regulate several aspects of religious practice such as the religious calendar (better coordination for Ramadan), the production and distribution of *halal* meat, the construction of mosques, and the training of Imams. The CFCM is also supposed to better represent the interests of Muslims and to act as an official channel of communication with the French government. A twin motivation underpins the creation of the CFCM: the will to promote a moderate version of Islam, compatible with Republican values and a will to remedy the situation of discrimination affecting Muslims in France.

That being said, the CFCM has no official website and no official mission statement. The CFCM has a board of directors elected for a three year period by the delegates of all French mosques. It contains representatives of all the main French Islamic associations such as the *Fédération nationale des musulmans en France* (National Federation of Muslims in France), the *Rassemblement des musulmans de France* (Regroupment of Muslims in France) and the *Union des organisations islamiques de France* (Union of Islamic Organizations of France). It is also subdivided in several local chapters called the *Conseils régionaux du culte musulman* (Regional Councils of the Muslim Cult). The CFCM has an online TV channel providing readings of the Quran, prayer schedules, and several news and opinion video

³⁸ Main, I. Proclaiming and Practicing Pro-immigration Values in Poland: A Case Study of Poznań. In E.M. Goździak, I. Main, and B. Suter (Eds.) *Europe and the Refugee Response: A Crisis of Values?* Abington: Routledge: forthcoming.

clips. The CFCM acts as an official interlocutor representing Muslims by organizing large debates and consultation. For instance, in 2015, it was the main actor at the center of a ‘dialogue with Islam’ organized by the Ministry of Interior and focused on the topics of security in places of worship, the image of Islam, the construction and maintenance of places of worship, the training of cult ministers and ritualistic practices.

There are also Christian organizations working with migrants in France. *La pastorale des migrants et des personnes itinérants* is one such example. This Catholic organization is composed of a large network of actors throughout the country who work with migrants as well as other mobile populations such as the Roma, sailors, boatmen, fairgrounds, and festival artisans. All the French territory is covered by this network that has representatives in each diocese and a national chaplain. It provides hospitality and solidarity on the basis of Christian values of caring and humanity. Their mission is coordinated at the national level and defined by the French Bishops’ Conference. *La Pastorale des Migrants* welcomes all migrants, regardless of their religious or cultural affiliation, and it accompanies people by taking care of material as well as human and spiritual needs. One main concern of this organization is the dimension of faith (regardless of the specific religion concerned): it takes into account the cultural dimension of faith in view of a better integration of newcomers.

These organizations stand in sharp contrast with Catholic and other Christian churches in Hungary and in Poland, for example, where the churches are opposing admission of Muslim refugees. Our field research in Hungary identified just a couple of examples of faith-based organizations’ involvement in helping refugees during the summer of 2015. One example includes the Catholic Bishop of Vac, Miklós Beer, and a Lutheran Bishop, Tamas Fabiny, who at the invitation of UNHCR recorded a video to welcome refugees. They talked in the video about the importance of welcoming the Stranger. People who watched the video were very surprised that the two of them would think it was not just fine, but important to welcome refugees. The Catholic and the Lutheran bishops are friends and they had done other joint projects. The Hungarian Evangelical Brotherhood is another example of solidarity with refugees. These organizations, however, are exceptions; most of the other churches oppose admitting non-Christian refugees.

6.4 How are values transmitted?

National and local actors use a range of practices and strategies to transmit values to refugees and immigrants. **Training and educational programs** dominate the scene.

Several countries in our sample have orientation courses for newcomers. These courses are usually state-funded and state-designed. In **Germany**, the Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees collaborates with the *Goethe Institute* in designing the integration course curricula. The German integration courses produce nationally recognized educational certificates, therefore, teachers and teaching institutions need to go through a rigorous accreditation process. As a result, teaching institutions are mostly professional organizations in adult education, such as the public *Volkshochschulen* (community colleges) and commercial language learning institutes. They also include the umbrella charity organizations of the Catholic and the Evangelical Churches in Germany, *Caritas* and *Diakonie Deutschland*, respectively, as well as some large migrant organizations, such as

the *Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion* (DITIB) and the *Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland* (TGD). Occasionally, teaching institutions are smaller local migrant and educational organizations.³⁹ Originally, integration courses focused mainly on language skills, but more recently integration courses have been redesigned to extend their emphasis on citizenship education, with a specific focus on values. Citizenship education is taught as a separate component of integration courses, which is called *Orientierungskurs* (orientation course). The Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees is responsible for designing both the concepts for integration courses as a whole and the curricula for orientation courses, while the *Goethe Institute* designs the language part of integration courses.

Additionally, **Germany** offers *Erstorientierungskurse* (Initial Orientation Courses) for asylum seekers who are not eligible for integration courses, usually because they do not come from countries with high asylum rate approvals. The course – comprised of 300 lessons (half the number of lessons included in the integration courses) – was initially developed and tested under the conservative *CSU* (*Christlich Soziale Union*) government in the federal state of Bavaria in 2013. It is now offered throughout Germany, but it is still based on the curriculum developed in Bavaria. The course serves to teach basic spoken language skills and practical information on German laws, rules, and conventions. In February 2016, a module called *Werte und Zusammenleben* (Values and Co-Existence) was added to the curriculum and declared to have an ‘exceptional status’ within the course. It is the only mandatory module in the course curriculum.

Since initial orientation courses do not produce legally recognized educational certificates, teachers and teaching institutions differ slightly from those offering integration courses. They are selected by federal state governments, rather than by the Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees. Apart from *Volkshochschulen*, they include a variety of Christian charity associations, such as *Johanniter-Unfall-Hilfe*, *Malteser Hilfsdienst* and the *Deutsches Rotes Kreuz* (German Red Cross). In the city of Karlsruhe and surrounding areas, they include the *Freundeskreis Asyl Karlsruhe e.V.*, a local non-profit association with the explicit mission to safeguard the rights and dignity of asylum seekers.

In addition to training and educational programs, countries deploy **other strategies to transmit shared values** to refugees and immigrants such as information dissemination through publications and websites; cross-cultural and religious dialogues; crime prevention programs, including prevention of religious extremism; familiarizing migrants with national laws and legal norms; activities focused on political (voting rights) and civic participation (volunteering opportunities).

In **France**, information about the values that are the foundation of the French Republic and French laws are provided to prospective migrants before their arrival in the country. The French Office for Immigration and Integration (OFFI) has published, on its website, a guide entitled *Living in France. Preparing for your arrival in France*. Prepared with the Ministry of Interior (*Ministère de l’intérieur*) and the General Direction of Foreigners in France (*Direction des étrangers en France*), the booklet clearly

³⁹ For a comprehensive list, see <http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Downloads/Infothek/Integrationskurse/Kurstraeger/ListeKurstraeger/liste-der-zugelassenen-kurstraeger-pdf.html>

indicates what are the official values of the French Republic: Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. The booklet also indicates that secularism is one of the values of the Republic.

A publication of the Ministry of Interior and the Direction of Foreigners in France titled the Booklet of the Citizen (*Livret du citoyen*) also provides key information about France's history, culture, values, institutions, geography, economy, and foreign policy. In this document, four official values are identified: liberty, equality, fraternity and secularism (although it is not clear whether those are values or principles and whether there is or not a distinction between values and principles in the official French discourse).⁴⁰

In **France**, school children are not the only group the government focuses on in terms of teaching and sharing common values. Since 2008, the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of National Education have set up an operation called OEPRE – '*Ouvrir l'école au parents pour la réussite des enfants*' (Opening the school to parents for the success of children). The objective of this initiative is to promote integration of parents who hail from outside the European Union by involving them in the education of their children. As part of this large operation, schools provide free training sessions at convenient hours to those immigrant parents so as to promote the acquisition of French language, the learning about the values of the Republic, how these values are achieved in the French society, and a better understanding of the school system.

6.5 How do countries ensure that refugees and migrants adhere to the promoted values?

Many European countries have implemented integration courses and contracts and set up civic and citizenship tests. In our sample, **France, Italy, and the Netherlands** have implemented not only language and integration course, but also mechanisms (tests, point systems) to ensure that immigrants fulfill their duties and not pose a burden on the welfare states. This is an explicit way to make sure that refugees and immigrants share the national values of the country where they have settled.

Although there are considerable differences between the various contracts and training programs, they all share a common purpose: to promote the core values declared to be the substantive foundation of the political community.⁴¹ This goal is consistent with the emphasis placed on 'shared values' by the European Commission and the Council of Europe in the 2000s,⁴² and with the proliferation of civic education policies aimed at inculcating values shared by 'good citizens.'⁴³

⁴⁰ Ministère de l'intérieur, Direction des étrangers en France, *Le livret du Citoyen*, Ministère de l'intérieur, 2015, p. 4-6.

⁴¹ Hachimi Alaoui, M. & Pélabay J., Integration by contract and the "values of the Republic": Investigating the French State as a value promoter for migrants (2003-2016). In E. M. Goździak, I. Main, & B. Suter (Eds.) *Europe and the Refugee Response: A Crisis of Values?* Abington: Routledge: forthcoming.

⁴² Pélabay, J. 2011a. 'L'Europe des "valeurs communes" et le recul du multiculturalisme: la diversité supplantée par l'unité?' *Revue Philosophique de Louvain*, 109 (4), pp. 747-70.

⁴³ See Kostakopoulou, D. 2010. Matters of Control: Integration Tests, Naturalisation Reform and Probationary Citizenship in the United Kingdom, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 36 (5): 829-46; Pélabay, J. 2011b. Former le "bon citoyen" libéral, *Raisons politiques* 44 (4): 117-38.

The notion of ‘contract’ underlines that integration is a ‘two-way process.’ The contract approach that focuses on an individual is different from the multicultural approaches that focus on communities and seek to recognize cultural differences.⁴⁴ Some scholars, Rogers Brubaker⁴⁵ and Christian Joppke,⁴⁶ among others, see these developments as the demise of multiculturalism and the ‘return of assimilation.’ Hatchimi and Pélabay posit that in the European context, national integration policies are developed with two main objectives: to condition the process of integration itself, notably through these contracts, and to pave the way for state promotion of the ‘values’ of the host society. “Taken together, these two objectives lead to a conception of integration where respect for ‘values’ placed at the heart of the ‘us’ are imposed on ‘others’ as a constraint included in a contract between foreigners and the State.”⁴⁷

In **France**, such contractual value-based integration has been implemented through a series of programs such as the *Contrat d’Accueil et d’Intégration* (CAI), drafted in 2003, its family reunification counterpart, the *Contrat d’Intégration pour la Famille* (CAIF), developed in 2007, and the more recent *Contrat d’Intégration Républicaine* (CIR), which replaced both of the former in 2016. In the forthcoming volume, Hatchimi and Pélabay argue that in relation to the political theory of European integration, there is good reason to give priority, in theory and in practice, to a rights-based – instead of a value-based – conception of integration. Nothing, they argue, prevents the discourse and practice of common values, be they national or European, from transmuting into a homogenizing and exclusionary identity politics focused on the survival of an ethical-cum-cultural version of the ‘us’ at the expense of the search for a truly pluralistic type of integration.⁴⁸

In addition to signing these contracts, in order to become citizens, foreigners need to show sufficient mastery of the French language and appropriate understanding of the history of France, its values and institutions. Since 2012, to demonstrate proficiency in French, migrants seeking naturalization must pass a French test called TCF (*Test de connaissance du français*). This is both an oral and written test. Some older people, over 60 years of age, are exempt from these tests. Additionally, other tests administered by the French Ministry of National Education can be substituted. Individuals who do not obtain the A1 level in French must agree to follow language training sessions. Language courses are provided by various associations, some of which are funded by the Office for Immigration and Integration. The *Centre national d’enseignement à distance* (CNED) offers online courses and preparation for the language tests of the French Ministry of Education. The FLE (*Français Langue Etrangère*) is a certification program for courses of French as a second language.

⁴⁴ Guiraudon, V. 2008. Integration Contracts for Immigrants: Common Trends and Differences in the European Experience (ARI). Available at: http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/riecano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/demography+population/ari43-2008

⁴⁵ Brubaker, R. 2001. The return of assimilation? Changing perspectives on immigration and its sequels in France, German, and the United States. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 24 (4): 531-548.

⁴⁶ Joppke, Ch. 2007. Beyond national models: Civic integration policies for immigrants in Western Europe, *West European Politics* 30 (1): 1-22, DOI: 10.1080/01402380601019613.

⁴⁷ Hatchimi Alaoui M. & Pélabay J., Integration by contract and the “values of the Republic”: Investigating the French State as a value promoter for migrants (2003-2016), In E.M. Goździak, I. Main, & B. Suter (Eds.) *Europe and the Refugee Response: A Crisis of Values?* Abington: Routledge: forthcoming.

⁴⁸ Hatchimi Alaoui M. & Pélabay J., Integration...

Since 2013, to prove that they have adequate knowledge of French history, culture, values, and institutions, citizenship applicants must meet with an agent of the Prefecture and show how much they know about those topics in an informal discussion with the agent.⁴⁹ The decree no. 2013-794 of August 30, 2013 stipulates the level of knowledge of French history and culture.⁵⁰ Some preparatory material for the citizenship test (mostly based on mock test questions) is divided into four topics: the history of France, the values of the Republic, the rights and obligations of citizens, general culture.⁵¹

In the **Netherlands** immigrants are obliged to sign a “Declaration of Participation” [*participatieverklaring*] after they have been granted admission to stay in the country. The Declaration is part of the Regulation of Integration. By doing so, the immigrants commit themselves to certain “Dutch Core Values” [*Nederlandse kernwaarden*]: freedom, equality, solidarity, and participation. These “core values” are explained in the Declaration of Participation itself. However, their meaning is not explained in any depth. Rather, these values are mainly transmitted to the immigrants in an obligatory workshop that all municipalities have to offer. Municipalities may themselves decide how exactly they explain and transmit these values. Additionally, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment published a brochure called *Core values of the Netherlands* [*Kernwaarden van Nederland*]. The meaning of these values is further explained in a video immigrants are supposed to watch.

After immigrants sign the Declaration of Participation, they have to pass the “integration exam” [*inburgeringsexamen*].⁵² The integration exam consists of a speaking, reading, listening, and writing sections (in Dutch, obviously). Moreover, immigrants have to prove knowledge of Dutch society and show that they are able to navigate the Dutch job market.⁵³ In order to become a Dutch citizen, an immigrant should have a clear understanding of four core values: freedom, equality, solidarity, and participation. Arguably, the idea of participation implies that refugees are responsible for their own integration process. They are required to become independent citizens in society. They need to learn the language and are encouraged to contribute to society.

Italy has developed a very detailed integration agreement⁵⁴ to be signed by all foreigners over the age of 16 who enter the country for the first time and request a residence permit of not less than one year. On March 10, 2012, *Regulation concerning the discipline of the integration agreement between the foreigner and the State* was issued. It contains mutual commitments: for the state – ensuring the enjoyment of fundamental rights and providing the means to acquire Italian language, culture, and principles of the Italian Constitution; and for the foreigner – the commitment to respect the legal and

⁴⁹ <https://www.immigration.interieur.gouv.fr/Accueil-et-accompagnement/La-nationalite-francaise/Le-livret-du-citoyen>

⁵⁰ <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000027914456&categorieLien=id>

⁵¹ <http://www.testdenationalite.fr/>

⁵² Immigrants are individually responsible for passing this exam within three years. This means classes are not obligatory. It is up to the immigrant how he or she wants to prepare himself or herself. See <https://www.vluchtelingenwerk.nl/feiten-cijfers/procedures-wetten-beleid/inburgering>. DUO lends 10.000 euros to the “vreemdeling” in order to get classes and to pay the exams. This money becomes a gift when he or she succeeds within the given time, if not he or she needs to refund.

⁵³ See <https://www.inburgeren.nl/examen-doen/oefenen.jsp>

⁵⁴ See: <http://www.integrazionemigranti.gov.it/normativa/procedureitalia/Documents/FAQAccordointegrazione/Accoro%20di%20integrazione%20-%20inglese.pdf> (description of the Integration Agreement in English).

civic rules of the country in order to follow a smooth path to integration. The agreement is divided into credits. It has a duration of two years and can be extended by one year. It is signed by the Prefect or his delegate. The foreigner undertakes to acquire an adequate level of spoken Italian language (equivalent at least to the A2 level referred to in the common European frame of reference), sufficient knowledge of the fundamental principles of the Constitution of the Republic, of civic culture and of civil life in Italy (with particular reference to the sectors of health, school, social services, work and tax obligations), and to guarantee the fulfillment of the obligation of education by minor children. To consider the agreement fulfilled, at the time of verification, the foreigner must achieve at least 30 credits that obligatorily include the aforementioned minimum levels of knowledge of the Italian language and of civil and social life.

At the time of signing, the foreigner is assigned 16 credits corresponding to the A1 level of spoken Italian language and basic knowledge of civic education and information on civil life in Italy. In order to favor this training path, the foreigner is given the opportunity to attend, within 90 days from the date of the subscription, a free course of civic training of a total duration of 10 hours. It credits: Italian language, civic culture, formal education, honors and public merits, business activities, family doctor, participation in the public life, housing.⁵⁵

6.6 ‘Nothing about us without us’: Refugee and migrant participation in integration efforts

And last but not least, we come to the crucial issue of refugee and migrant participation in policy-making and program design. The Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) calls for refugees to be directly involved in the pursuit of the GCR’s objectives. The Compact calls for the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) to co-host, along with one or more member states, a Global Refugee Forum (GRF) every four years. The first Global Refugee Forum, scheduled for December 2019 in Geneva, is only months away. Sceptics doubt whether meaningful participation in the GRF will be achieved.⁵⁶ In a recent tweet, Jeff Crisp reminded us that UNHCR committed itself to the principle of refugee participation in its mission statement⁵⁷ in the 1990s. As early as 1986, Robert Mazur⁵⁸ wrote about the need to involve refugees into assistance and development projects. A year later, in 1987, Lance Clark wrote a paper for the Refugee Policy Group entitled *Promoting Refugee Participation in Assistance Projects*, in which he wrote: “Despite pronouncements of support from UNHCR and many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), refugee participation remains more talk than action. What can be done to improve this situation?”⁵⁹ The late Barbara Harrell-Bond, the grand dame of refugee studies, had written probably

⁵⁵ The full list of the Credits (in Italian) can be found here:

http://www.libertaciviliimmigrazione.dlci.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/allegati/crediti_riconosciuti.pdf

⁵⁶ Drozdowski, H. & Yarnell, M. 2019. Promoting Refugee Participation in the Global Refugee Forum: Walking the Walk. Issue Brief. Washington, DC: Refugee International. Available at: <https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2019/7/11/promoting-meaningful-participation-in-the-global-refugee-forum-walking-the-walk>

⁵⁷ See <https://www.unhcr.org/4847b7832.pdf>

⁵⁸ Mazur, R. 1986. Linking popular initiative and aid agencies: The case of refugees. *Refugee Issues* (December). Oxford, UK: Refugee Studies Program.

⁵⁹ Clark, L. 1987. *Promoting Refugee Participation in Assistance Projects*. Washington, DC: Refugee Policy Group. Available at: http://repository.forcedmigration.org/show_metadata.jsp?pid=fmo:399

the most about the need for a refugee-centered approach to policy-making and assistance. Her papers are too numerous to mention here. Despite all these discussions, we are still calling for meaningful refugee participation.

In this study, we found a few promising attempts to involve refugees and migrants in the multi-level governance processes. The European Migrant Advisory Board (EMAB), an initiative of the Partnership on Inclusion of Migrants and Refugees, financially supported by the Open Society Foundation, is one example of an attempt to include refugees' and migrants' voices in European policy-making.⁶⁰ In the already mentioned edited volume, Robert Larruina and Halleh Ghorashi⁶¹ write about the possibilities and constraints the members of the Board encountered in their efforts to bring their perspectives and experiences to the Partnership. They concluded that the EMAB is at risk of falling into 'the danger of a single story,' referring to the idea that accounts of success can never be a good alternative to the negative discourse on migrants since both are essentializing and homogenizing.⁶² In the authors' opinion, the EAMB members are "caught between providing success stories and carrying the burden of representation, which prevents them from being considered important enough for who they are, for having perspectives and narratives that come from their specific life worlds and their different networks, both of which are quite different than those of policymakers from the dominant group."

In **Sweden**, the umbrella organization *Samarbetsorgan för etniska organisationer i Sverige* (SIOS) is the nation-wide umbrella organization for ethnic associations, consisting of ca. 350 local ethnic organizations with ca. 50,000 members in total. It is recognized (i.e., partially funded) by the government for its promotion of ethnic and cultural identity (mainly language and culture), representation of ethnic groups' interests and promotion of their participation in society (diversity politics). The organization is a collaborative organ for ethnic associations, independent of party politics and religion. It consists of voluntary collaboration between various ethnic associations for the purpose of working for cultural diversity in society in a democratic manner. Its main purpose is to promote language, culture, education and other issues related to minority politics. SIOS' activities aimed at achieving these goals include opinion making, writing position papers and making claims through statements, as well as through educational, information and project activities. In the area of integration, SIOS holds an active role in influencing policy. The organization does this through lobbying and other means of participation in the political process (consultation). Its vision of integration is based on a two-way process with ethnic organizations as equal partners. As such, it is against assimilationism. SIOS advocates for an open, democratic and culturally diverse society that recognizes ethnic and cultural diversity. Its vision spells out the values of dialogue, equality, freedom of choice and justice as guiding principles in this process.

⁶⁰ Larruina, R. & Berg, R. 2018. *European Migrant Advisory Board: Initial footsteps: January-June 2018*. Unpublished report, Institute for Societal Resilience, Refugee Academy, VU Amsterdam.

⁶¹ Larruina, R. & Ghorashi, H. Box-ticking Exercise or Real Inclusion? Challenges of Including Refugees' Perspectives in EU Policy. In E.M. Goździak, I. Main, & B. Suter (Eds.) *Europe and the Refugee Response: A Crisis of Values?* Abington: Routledge: forthcoming.

⁶² Ghorashi, H. 2016. *Het gevaar van het enkelvoudig verhaal*. 10 March. Available at: <https://www.kis.nl/blog/het-gevaar-van-het-enkelvoudig-verhaal>

One of many **German** organizations providing support for migrants is DaMigra, an umbrella and advocacy network incorporating 71 migrant women organizations working on migrant women's rights and self-organization. It was founded in 2014 within the context of a program initiated by the BAMF (*Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge*, Office for Migrants and Refugees) and the Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend (BMFSFJ, Federal Ministry for Family, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth) to encourage national networking among migrant organizations. Its recent project, called MUT, aims to foster inclusion of recently arrived refugee women using the experience and skills of migrant women who have lived in Germany for a long time. On its website, DaMigra does not use the term values. In a workshop on "Value education in the immigration society" organized by BAMF and the Bertelsmann Stiftung in 2016, DaMigra's director, Delal Atmaca, explained that DaMigra understood value education as advocating equal rights.⁶³ On its website, the MUT project defines its own approach as guided by the objectives of "empowerment and human rights education." Its method of involving migrant women as councilors and teachers for newly arrived refugee women is key to the project's overall aim. It encourages migrant women to think about their own experiences of exclusion and marginalization in German society as politicizing experiences that have raised their self-awareness and led them to advocate their own interests. And it encourages refugee women to think of migrant women as role models precisely for their experience of overcoming adversity and defining their own place in Germany. MUT understands integration in terms of women's "political, cultural, professional and cultural participation on an equal rights basis" rather than advocating a particular value content.

In **Poland**, there are a few programs focused on immigrant integration. In Gdańsk, there is the Council of Migrants (*Rada Imigrantów i Imigrantek*); it has been operating since 2016. In Warsaw, there is the Commission for Social Dialogue with Migrants (*Komisja Dialogu Społecznego ds. Cudzoziemców przy UM Warszawa*); it has been in existence since 2012. Both are supported by municipal governments. The Migrant Info Point (MIP) in Poznań was established in 2013 and is supported mainly by grants.

The city of Gdańsk developed an exceptional model of immigrants' integration. In May 2015, the Mayor of Gdańsk established Poland's first cross-sectoral and interdisciplinary task force on immigrant integration. The team's task was to assess available resources and capabilities to support immigrant residents of Gdańsk and to identify key needs and problems. The model was developed as a joint effort of more than 150 people representing 70 different public institutions and non-governmental organizations. The model consisted of identifying key values and principles, formulating the vision and goals of the initiative as well as tasks in areas of education, local communities, culture, violence and discrimination, health, employment, social assistance, and housing.⁶⁴ It has been gradually implemented with a leading role of the Council of Immigrants, which was created on September 19, 2016. Twelve Gdańsk residents of foreign origin (Chechnya, Columbia, Germany, Kazakhstan, Palestine, Russia, Syria, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, and Tunisia) started to advise the Mayor and other local authorities on migrant and refugee integration issues and policies. To represent the immigrant population in its variety, the selected volunteers have different backgrounds, education levels, and religious beliefs, and include 4 women. Profession-wise, the group includes a doctor, a

⁶³ Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016, 50

⁶⁴ <https://www.gdansk.pl/download/2017-06/91579.pdf>

PhD student, an activist, a social worker, a journalist, an entrepreneur. What they have in common is their willingness to live, work, and raise their children in Gdańsk. This local Immigrant Council is Poland's first official advisory body consisting solely of immigrants.⁶⁵ In 2019, the Council held its second election.

“My personal ambition is to encourage immigrant women to participate in the public life. I would like them to realize that beyond the legalization of their residence and the incorporation into the labor market, we – the women of Gdańsk – can be free, strong, innovative, capable, resilient and we can continue with our social and personal development,” said the Chairmen of the Immigrants Council, Karol Liliana Lopez, who came to Gdańsk from Colombia.⁶⁶ Gdańsk is known worldwide for the role it has played in Polish history: Second World War broke out here; Gdańsk is also the birthplace of Poland's Solidarity movement. Are these new immigrant initiatives evidence that the spirit of solidarity lives on today? Do historical references help the inhabitants of Gdańsk maintain this spirit? Or maybe it is due to the size of the city and the number of NGOs which enable the success of such projects?⁶⁷ In many major Polish cities NGOs have been providing support for migrants for years. “We have over 20 visitors and about 40 phone calls a day asking for assistance with documents needed for temporary/permanent residence permits as well as procedures on how to set up a business in Poland,” explains Yulia Szavlovkaya from the Immigrants Support Centre (*Centrum Wsparcia Imigrantów i Imigrantek w Trójmieście*), an NGO providing assistance to migrants in the Tri-city area. They support the newcomers in various ways: show how to apply for temporary residence and work permit using the electronic system, what documents companies should prepare to employ non-EU citizens, what to do when an employer does not pay wages, and who to refer to in case of discrimination.⁶⁸ *Migrant Info Point* in Poznań, working on support and integration of migrants has been involving migrants as employees and volunteers in various programs: mentoring, cultural advisors, coordinators of activities.⁶⁹ This way migrants share their cultural and language competences and migratory experiences, and are also supported on the labor market. Agnieszka Kosowicz from the Polish Migration Forum (*Polskie Forum Migracyjne, PFM*) in Warsaw emphasized that involvement of migrants in various organizations working in the sphere of integration is essential. PFM strives for Poland to become a country, where people of different races, religions and cultures want to cooperate and understand each other. Its mission statement reads “We believe that people are equal regardless of their race, nationality, ethnicity, views, religion or other factors. We wish humans to enjoy human rights, and people to be treated with respect, regardless of where they come from. This is why we support and develop initiatives that lead to dialogue of people representing various cultures, mainly in Poland. We also work with Polish migrants abroad, and support families affected in some way by migration.”

⁶⁵ <https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/news/poland-the-countrys-first-immigrant-council-appointed-in-gdask>

⁶⁶ <http://neweasterneurope.eu/2017/06/20/integration-starts-at-home/>

⁶⁷ <http://neweasterneurope.eu/2017/06/20/integration-starts-at-home/>

⁶⁸ <http://neweasterneurope.eu/2017/06/20/integration-starts-at-home/>

⁶⁹ <http://migrant.poznan.pl/en/>

7. Recommendations

Tomes have been written about immigrant integration, especially about the experiences of refugees and immigrants in traditional immigration countries such as Australia, Canada, and the United States. Research shows that many factors affect immigrant integration. While rights-based immigration and integration policies at the national levels are important, they are not a substitute for action at the community level where the web of local relationships determines the immigrant experience. Experiences at local levels shape not only immigrant attitudes toward their new country but also the cohesiveness of the neighborhoods, towns, and cities they adopt as their new homes. In many different countries, local actors, including the newcomers themselves, have found novel ways to assume this responsibility and foster the incorporation of newly arrived immigrants into broader society. There is a need **to increase participation of refugees and migrants and ethnic community organizations in the decision-making** processes in Brussels, in the capital cities, and in local municipalities. Our field research suggests that local organizations need the support of national governments, but they also need the opportunity for self-determination. The populist tendencies to present refugees and immigrants as a threat to ‘European values’ and traditions of tolerance, freedom, and democracy are misplaced. History reminds us that these principles have been fought for and won, usually against the violent resistance of European elites. Ironically, many of the refugees seeking safe haven in Europe today have struggled for the same values and rights in their home countries. Therefore, teaching refugees and immigrants ‘European values’ is patronizing and counterproductive. There is a need to engage newcomers in a thoughtful dialogue to identify what values they want to impart on their children as the second generation of Europeans grows up in Europe. We might be pleasantly surprised how much we all have in common.

The news media significantly influence the popular perception of refugees and immigrants, reinforcing stereotypes in some cases, while empathizing with the foreigners’ experiences in others. In settlement areas with little previous ethnic diversity, the arrival of newcomers has often attracted substantial news coverage, magnifying their presence. Newcomers’ status – real or imagined – frequently influences the tone of the media’s treatment. When asylum seekers are portrayed as irregular or illegal migrants or miscategorized as labor migrants, conflicts and accusations of greed and the desire to take social benefits from European citizens arise. Our analysis suggests that all the countries under study include employment programs in their integration packets. It is important **to provide refugees and immigrants with work permits as early as possible and integrate them into the labor market.** Economically, opportunities for upward mobility represent a crucial incentive for newcomers to integrate themselves. Investment and professional advancement beyond ethnic businesses not only promote linkages with the host society but also help newcomers build foundations for their children. And finally, labor force participation not only provides migrants with sustainable livelihoods, but also prevents social isolation.

Regrettably, coverage of immigrant issues frequently concentrates on moments of conflict between natives and newcomers, particularly in the aftermath of terrorist attacks. It is important to counter these misperceptions and inform the general public that all of the terrorists that launched attacks on European cities were born and raised in Europe. It begs the question: why were they radicalized? Perhaps they were easily lured by terrorist organizations because we failed to provide them with

opportunities to thrive in the society. In the context of the ‘war on terror,’ warnings against disenfranchisement of newcomers have taken on new resonance. Detentions of foreign-born residents are a high-profile example of what many have called a widespread erosion of immigrants’ civil liberties. It is also important to support – with EU/national and local programs and funds – media coverage of situations of cooperation and beneficial coexistence of migrants, refugees and natives, based on individual narratives and academic research. There are many stories that could be written, films that could be made, plays that could be performed about thousands of daily positive encounters when values are shared, discussed, learnt, and practiced.

Integration depends on the empowerment of immigrants for participation in the wider community. In both social and economic terms, it is important to stress opportunities and obligations as much as rights and entitlements. One of the largest obstacles to this goal is that mediating institutions such as local governments, schools, mainstream civic organizations often overlook the newcomer voice. This condition owes largely to immigrants’ lack of familiarity with their new communities. **Links of incorporation within newcomer groups and with broad society remedy this condition over time, but initiatives undertaken shortly after migrants arrive in a particular locality have potential to accelerate this orientation.** We need to involve sports clubs, scouting organizations, faith-based and civil society organizations to lead by example and make integration as seamless and painless as possible.

The European Commission has a scope to provide financial resources and non-monetary support to these kinds of initiatives. In particular, the Commission **ought to strategize how to support refugee and immigrant youth as well as children of refugees and immigrants to ensure their civic and political participation in their respective countries.** The tendency to see children of refugees and immigrants as growing up in migrancy is dangerous. Lena Näre⁷⁰ views migrancy as “the socially constructed subjectivity of ‘migrant’ (...), which is inscribed on certain bodies by the larger society in general and legislative practices in particular. (...) Very often the inscribed subjectivity of migrancy is not only attributed to those who have migrated”⁷¹ but also to children of immigrants, children who have never moved away from their place of birth. Increasing numbers of the world’s children are growing up in this space, even when they are not migrants, but because their parents or even grandparents once were. We need to show these children that we value them and that they are part of us, not part of them.

⁷⁰ Näre, L. 2013. Migrancy, gender and social class in domestic labour and social care in Italy: An intersectional analysis of demand. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 39(4), 601-623.

⁷¹ Seeberg, M.L & Goździak, E.M. 2016. Contested Childhoods. Growing up in Migrancy. In: Seeberg M., Goździak E.M. (eds) *Contested Childhoods: Growing up in Migrancy*. IMISCOE Research Series. Springer, Cham.

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About NOVAMIGRA

Several, partly interconnected crises have profoundly challenged the European project in recent years. In particular, reactions to the arrival of 1.25 million refugees in 2015 called into question the idea(l) of a unified Europe. What is the impact of the so-called migration and refugee crisis on the normative foundations and values of the European Union? And what will the EU stand for in the future?

NOVAMIGRA studies these questions with a unique combination of social scientific analysis, legal and philosophical normative reconstruction and theory.

This project:

- Develops a precise descriptive and normative understanding of the current “value crisis”;
- Assesses possible evolutions of European values; and
- Considers Europe’s future in light of rights, norms and values that could contribute to overcoming the crises.

The project is funded with around 2.5 million Euros under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme for a period of three years.

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